Sequential Decision Making, Part II

The project aims at generalizing the classical framework for non-cooperative games in extensive form. In particular, the classical results in game theory the existence and uniqueness of outcomes induced by strategies, the existence of subgame perfect equilibria for perfect information games, the equivalence of extensive form games that have the same semi-reduced normal form, or the equivalence of mixed and behavioral strategies under perfect recall are investigated without any finiteness assumptions. Preferences for players that do not necessarily conform to the expected utility axioms will be considered from the perspective of sequential consistency. Furthermore, the measure theoretic framework required for solution concepts like Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium or Sequential Equilibrium will be extended so as to allow for infinite action spaces and horizons. Generalizing the definitions of choice systems or information sets will allow for novel insights into certain aspects of absent-mindedness and connect this research to behavioral economics. We aim at providing characterizations in each step, so as to identify necessary on top of sufficient conditions.

No additional funding sources recorded.